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DISCRETE LOGARITHMS IN GENERALIZED JACOBIANS
S. D. GALBRAITH AND B. A. SMITH
Abstract. De´che`ne has proposed generalized Jacobians as a source of groups for public-key
cryptosystems based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Her specific
proposal gives rise to a group isomorphic to the semidirect product of an elliptic curve and
a multiplicative group of a finite field. We explain why her proposal has no advantages over
simply taking the direct product of groups. We then argue that generalized Jacobians offer
poorer security and efficiency than standard Jacobians.
1. Introduction
Recently, De´che`ne [4] has proposed generalized Jacobians as a source of groups for public-
key cryptosystems based on the hardness of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Generalized
Jacobians offer a natural generalization of both torus-based and curve-based cryptography.
De´che`ne’s specific proposal gives rise to a group isomorphic to the semidirect product of an
elliptic curve E(k) and a multiplicative group of a finite field Gm(k). She remarks in Section 6
of [4] that the DLP in such a generalized Jacobian can be reduced to sequentially solving a DLP
in E(k) followed by a DLP in Gm(k) and so it is “at least as hard as a DLP in E(k) and at least
as hard as a DLP in Gm(k)”.
Our main observation follows from applying the standard Pohlig-Hellman reduction and there-
fore reducing to the case of elements of prime order. It then immediately follows (see Proposi-
tion 2.1) that one can solve the DLP in the generalized Jacobian by solving a number of DLPs in
E(k) and Gm(k) in parallel. One concludes that the generalized Jacobian DLP is at most as hard
as the DLP in E(k) and the DLP in Gm(k). As we will explain, one can get the same security
with greater efficiency by simply taking the direct product E(k)×Gm(k).
In our presentation we consider the DLP in the simpler and more general setting of extensions
of algebraic groups. We will argue that extensions offer no advantages over the existing Jacobian
or torus constructions for DLP-based cryptography.
Throughout this article, we let k be a finite field. All varieties are nonsingular k-varieties. We
say that a morphism of algebraic groups is explicit if it may be evaluated in polynomial time.
Algebraic groups are said to be explicitly isomorphic if there is an explicit isomorphism between
them. All algebraic groups in this article are commutative, and written additively. We denote
algebraic groups with script letters and their underlying varieties with capital letters: so if A is
an algebraic group, then A denotes its underlying variety.
2. Discrete Logarithms in Extensions of Commutative Algebraic Groups
Fix a pair of algebraic groups A and B. An extension of A by B is an algebraic group C
together with separable homomorphisms ι : B → C and pi : C → A, all defined over k, such that
the following sequence is exact:
(1) 0→ B
ι
−→ C
pi
−→ A→ 0.
We will assume that the maps ι, pi, and ι−1 (where it is defined) are explicit. A trivial example
of an extension of A by B is the direct product C = A× B, with ι and pi the obvious maps. The
motivating example for this work is the case where C is a generalized Jacobian: here A is the
Jacobian of an algebraic curve, B is a certain affine algebraic group,1 and the group structure of
1The algebraic group in question is isomorphic to a product of multiplicative groups (i.e. a torus), together with
a product of Witt groups, in which the DLP is trivial.
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C is determined by a map cm : A
2 → B. The generalized Jacobians proposed for cryptography by
De´che`ne are the special case where A is an elliptic curve and B is the multiplicative group.
We wish to assess the suitability of C as a source of groups for cryptography, compared with
A and B. Suppose we wish to solve a DLP in a subgroup G of C(k). The group G is necessarily
finite, and without loss of generality we may assume that G is cyclic. By the standard reduction
of Pohlig and Hellman [7], we may reduce to the case where the order of G is prime.
Proposition 2.1. Let G be a subgroup of C(k), of prime order l. If G is contained in ι(B), then
the DLP in G reduces to the DLP in a subgroup of order l in B(k). Otherwise, the DLP in G
reduces to the DLP in a subgroup of order l in A(k).
Proof. If G is a subgroup of ι(B), then it is explicitly isomorphic to the subgroup ι−1(G) of B(k).
Otherwise, G has trivial intersection with the kernel of pi, so it is explicitly isomorphic to the
subgroup pi(G) of A(k). 
Corollary 2.2. The DLP in C(k) is no harder than the hardest DLP in A(k) and B(k).
Proposition 2.1 shows that if G is not contained in ι(B), then the DLP in G reduces to the DLP
in A(k). It is important to note that the absence of a natural projection from C to B does not
preclude the existence of a homomorphism mapping G into B; thus the DLP in G may, in some
cases, be reduced to the DLP in B(k) as well. For many subgroups G, therefore, the DLP in G is
only as hard as the easier of the DLP in A(k) and the DLP in B(k). This means that we can have
a relative loss in security in using extensions of A by B rather than using A and B independently.
Remark 2.3. Couveignes [2] shows that if C is a commutative algebraic group extension of A by B,
then there exists an algorithm to solve the DLP in C in subexponential time in the size of C if and
only if there exists such algorithms for A and for B [2, Theorem 2]. This is due to the existence
of a k-rational isogeny (not constructed in [2]) from C to the direct product A× B.
3. Extensions Presented by Cocycles
Extensions C ofA by B are effectively determined by the choice of a symmetric 2-cocycle (cocycle
in the sequel): that is, a map c : A2 → B satisfying the relations
(2) c(P,Q) + c(P +Q,R) = c(Q,R) + c(P,Q +R) and c(P,Q) = c(Q,P )
for all P , Q and R in A. Note that c is not required to be a homomorphism.
Given a cocycle c : A2 → B, we construct an extension C of A by B as follows. The underlying
variety of C is the direct product A× B, the identity element is (0A, 0B), and the group law and
inverse maps are the morphisms mc : (A×B)
2 → A×B and ic : A×B → A×B defined by
mc : ((PA, PB), (QA, QB)) 7−→ (PA +QA, PB +QB + c(PA, QA))
and
ic : (PA, PB) 7−→ (−PA,−PB + c(PA,−PA))
(here + and − denote group operations in A and B). Note that associativity and commutativity
follow from the relations (2) above. We say that C is the algebraic group presented by the cocycle c.
Generalized Jacobians (for background, see [8]) are examples of extensions presented by cocycles;
we will give an example below. The direct product group A×B is the extension presented by the
zero cocycle, sending each element of A2 to 0B. Our assumption that ι and pi are explicit holds in
any extension presented by a cocycle, as shown by the following easy lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let 0→ B
ι
→ C
pi
→ A → 0 be an extension presented by a cocycle c : A2 → B.
(1) The injection ι : B → C is given by ι(P ) = (0A, P ). The subgroups of C in the image of
ι are precisely those of the form {(0A, P ) : P in some subgroup of B}, and in such groups
the map ι−1 given by ι−1((0A, P )) = P reduces the DLP to a DLP in B.
(2) The projection pi : C → A is given by pi(PA, PB) = PA. This map reduces the DLP in any
subgroup of C not in the image of ι to a DLP in A.
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Lemma 3.1 implies that the difficulty of the DLP in C cannot be increased by a “clever” choice
of c. Indeed, each prime-order subgroup G of any extension C either projects faithfully into A or
can be pulled back to B. In particular, the DLP in any extension of A by B is no harder than the
DLP in the direct product A× B.
Suppose C is an extension presented by a cocycle c : A2 → B. Computing the group law in C
requires the same computations as computing the group law in A×B, together with an application
of the cocycle c and an extra group operation in B — so computing the group law in C requires
at least as much space and time as computing the group law in A × B. Further, C and A × B
have the same underlying variety, so representing their elements requires the same space. Thus
computing in C requires at least as much time and space as computing in A× B.
For the purposes of DLP-based cryptography, the group A×B offers no advantages over A and
B. We have seen that the DLP in A× B can be no harder than the hardest DLP in A or B, and
computing in A×B requires at least as much space and time as computing in A and B separately.
Therefore, using A × B in a DLP-based cryptosystem in place of A or B offers no advantage in
security, while requiring more storage space and computing time. Similarly, using an extension C
presented by a cocycle c : A2 → B instead of A or B alone offers no increase in security, since it
has no larger prime-order subgroups than those already present in A and B, while requiring at
least as much time and space as computing in A and B. We have thus derived the following result.
Proposition 3.2. If C is an extension of A by B presented by a cocycle, then any DLP-based
cryptosystem based on a subgroup of C(k)
• is no more secure,
• takes more space, and
• is less computationally efficient
than the analogous cryptosystem based on A(k) or B(k) (whichever has the harder DLP).
Example 3.3. In [3] and [4], De´che`ne proposes certain generalized Jacobians of elliptic curves as a
supply of cryptographic groups. Suppose E is an elliptic curve over k, and let O be the identity of
E . Let Gm denote the multiplicative group over k (we will write its group law multiplicatively).
Fix points M and N (neither equal to O) on E ; the effective divisor m = (M) + (N) is called
the modulus. The generalized Jacobian JE,m is defined to be the extension of E by Gm presented
by the cocycle cm(P,Q) = fP,Q(M)/fP,Q(N), where fP,Q is any function on E with divisor
(P +Q) + (O) − (P )− (Q). 2 The group law on JE,m is given by
(P, λ) + (Q,µ) = (P +Q, λ · µ · cm(P,Q)).
We remark that this group law was also used in Section 3 of [5].
The observations of Proposition 3.2 all apply to JE,m. We know that the DLP in JE,m(k) is no
harder than the hardest DLP in E(k) and Gm(k). Thus using cyclic subgroups of JE,m(k) instead
of subgroups of E(k) or Gm(k) requires extra work, and extra space, for no gain in security. Indeed,
it is widely recognised that elliptic curves give better security and performance than multiplicative
groups of finite fields. Hence, it would be better either to remove the Gm(k) and use only E(k)
(saving space and time), or spending the extra bits on a larger ground field K and using a prime
order elliptic curve E(K) instead (maximizing security).
Remark 3.4. De´che`ne suggests taking M and N to be defined over a finite extension K/k, so that
the cocycle cm maps E(k)
2 into Gm(K), and such that both E(k) and Gm(K) contains a subgroup
of prime order l. Balasubramanian and Koblitz [1] have shown that for general elliptic curves, the
degree of the smallest such extension (called the embedding degree) tends to grow with l, rendering
computation in Gm(K) and G exponentially difficult. In practice, therefore, the suggestion requires
E to be a so-called pairing-friendly curve, which means there is a homomorphism from E to Gm
as used in the Frey–Ru¨ck and MOV attacks [5, 6]. As a result, this suggestion weakens E , and
therefore (by Corollary 2.2) weakens JE,m. In fact, as noted above, the generalised Jacobian group
law is the same as the method proposed by [5] for computing the Tate pairing (except the function
2We may take fP,Q = v/l, where l is the line through P and Q, and v is the vertical line through the third point
of intersection of l with E.
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is inverted). Hence, if m is the least common multiple of the order of P and the order of M −N
in E(K), then computing m times (P, 1) gives (0, 〈P,M −N〉−1m ).
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